Norms, Mobilization and Conflict: The Merowe Dam as a Case Study by Ali, Nada et al.
0	  
	  
<Article> 
 
Norms, Mobilization and Conflict: 
The Merowe Dam as a Case Study 
Nada Ali*, R. Dempsey Willis∗∗, A. El Moghraby∗∗∗, M. J. Hashim∗∗∗∗  
	  
	  
Abstract:	  	  
This article investigates dynamics of mobilization over environmental and human 
rights norms in the context of undemocratic governments. We test the suggestion in 
norm diffusion theories that success of domestic struggles in this context depends on 
the level of internalization of norms brought forth by international pressure. We find 
that the internalization (or lack thereof) of global norms by the Government of Sudan 
does not explain its recognition of environmental justice claims in this case. 
Furthermore, the various litigation efforts pursued by affected people outside of 
Sudan did not influence their campaign. However, a combination of the political 
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climate in the country and a unique political interplay between the government and a 
distinct group of the affected people may have led to the singular success of their 
campaign. We use a combination of discourse analysis, legal analysis, norms-
mapping and semi-structured interviews to reach conclusions.  
 
Keywords: Spiral Model, Norm-diffusion, Mobilization, Environmental Litigation, 
Resettlement, Internal Displacement. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this article, we examine the drivers of behaviour of actors involved in struggles 
over large-scale development projects. The article uses the Merowe Dam in North 
Sudan as a case study. In addition to widespread displacement, the case presents us 
with an on-going conflict that developed asymmetrically with respect to the groups 
affected, and that resulted in a number of litigation efforts both within and outside 
Sudan. This represents a unique opportunity to examine the role played by the 
involvement of transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in seeding the 
struggle and in the development of relevant legal norms. We use a modified version 
of the spiral model to understand (i) how conflicts arise in the first place; (ii) what 
determines their trajectory; and consequently (iii) the best way to manage them in the 
future. These questions are examined with reference to the three main actors involved: 
people affected by the Merowe Dam and its reservoir – who call themselves the Dam 
Affected People (DAPs); the Government of Sudan (GoS); and the international 
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litigation NGOs (INGOs)). The basic assumption of our theoretical model is that the 
extent of congruence or divergence in norms between governments and affected 
people is likely to determine the trajectory of conflict, but that it may also dictate the 
success or failure of mobilization.  
 
The article uses a combination of discourse analysis, legal analysis, norms-mapping 
and semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with six key informants to reach 
conclusions. The interviews were conducted with (a) three local activists - each 
belonging to one of the affected groups and having been involved in the various 
committees organized to negotiate with GoS;1 (b) the activist who spearheaded the 
litigation efforts outside Sudan;2 and (c) representatives from two of the INGOs 
leading these efforts.3 
 
The case of the struggle over the negative impacts of the construction of the Merowe 
Dam on communities inhabiting the surrounding area unveils a complex picture of 
conflicting norms and unusual patterns of government responses. As expected in 
cases such as this, mobilization over the rights of the affected people resulted in a 
mixed bag of successes and failures. While the context of the struggle and the legal 
matrix against which the story has unfolded is shared, the scale of injustices visited on 
each of the affected groups was markedly different even when distance of the 
particular locality from the dam is taken into consideration. The extent to which each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Reference to the activists will be by using the letter A coupled with the first letter of the name of the 
affected group, e.g., the activist from Manasir will be referred to as AM. 
2 We will refer to this activist as the Justice Broker throughout the paper and we will use the acronym 
(JB) to reference his interview contributions, but we might also refer to him by his name (Ali Askouri). 
3 We will refer to them in the separate sections covering the case as the representatives of their 
respective INGOs or by their names where the same is appropriate. 
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of these groups affirmed their preferences and realized their entitlements also 
differed.  
 
The suggestion in this article is that internal political dynamics may have played a 
bigger role in advancing or halting the efforts of different groups than the apparent or 
real internalization of environmental justice norms. This may put into question the 
assumption inherent in the Spiral Model that the responses of governments (including 
undemocratic ones) are the result of the internalization of norms which is 
consequently dependent on external pressure. It is to be noted that in the case of 
Sudan, norms of justice relevant to the construction of dams were recognized and to 
some extent reflected in legislation and national policy documents. Implementation, 
however, was lacking and government responses benefited from the inherent conflict 
between norms of development, economic growth and access to water and energy. 
We find that, rather than international norms influencing norm uptake in Sudan as 
anticipated by the Spiral Model, the struggle against the Merowe Dam has in fact 
contributed to a nascent exploration of norms currently being pursued by transnational 
litigation INGOs as a direct result of being involved in the mobilization over this 
cause. The logical policy implication is thus to shift focus back to issues of 
governance, domestic capacity building and legal reforms alongside the conventional 
focus on the development of international norms and their diffusion. Of particular 
interest in the latter respect from the point of view of participants in the struggle is 
ensuring access to remedy against gross violations of accepted legal standards on the 
international level. 
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We present the theoretical model we used to analyze the case study in section 2 
together with some explanation of the methodology based on the theoretical design. In 
order to provide the appropriate context for the discussion that follows, we set out the 
administrative structure and legal framework governing environmental protection in 
Sudan in section 3. Section 4 presents the factual background of the resettlement and 
resistance of the affected communities. Section 5 is dedicated to responses to 
mobilization against the Merowe Dam by GoS as well as by litigation INGOs, which 
adopted the struggle. A discussion follows in section 6 and a short conclusion is 
offered in closing.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY 
This research builds upon the rich and diverse body of literature looking at norms 
from a constructivist perspective.4 We adopt the definition of norms as ‘standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’.5 Using this approach, we also 
encompass the traditional international relations concepts of self-interest, power, and 
language as central components to decision making, in this case by the DAPs and 
GoS. As stated by Goertz and Diehl, ‘ [n]orms and their impact on behaviour cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 J.L Campbell, 'Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy' (2002) 28(1) Annual Review of Sociology, pp. 21-38 
; S. Cardenas, 'Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State 
Behavior' (2004) 6(2) International Studies Review, pp. 213-32; J.T. Checkel, 'The Constructive Turn 
in International Relations Theory' (1998) 50(2) World Politics,  pp. 324-48; M. Finnermore and K. 
Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52(4) International 
Organization, pp. 887-917. 
 
5 F. Kratochwil & J. Gerard Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the 
State' (1986) 40(4) International Organization, pp. 753-75, at 769.   
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be studied apart from issues of power and self-interest’6 – which will become clearly 
evident throughout this article.  
In order to understand the responses of the different actors involved in the struggle 
including INGOs, we use a modified version of the Spiral Model developed by Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink7 (See Figure 1 The Basic Form of the Spiral Model). The spiral 
model was originally developed to consider different stages of reactions by 
governments to boomerang effect mobilizations over human rights issues.8 The model 
captures the processes by which domestic struggles to overcome human rights abuses 
can be addressed by the involvement of transnational advocacy networks and indeed 
international norms. Initially viewed as a ‘boomerang’ effect, where the domestic 
groups would repeatedly reach out to transnational groups, in the 1990s the model 
evolved to capture a more robust and detailed process for human rights change. In its 
simplest form, the Spiral Model works through five consecutive phases: repression, 
denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and, finally, rule-consistent behaviour; 
emphasizing the importance of pressure from the bottom up (domestic, in this case by 
the DAPs) and the top down (transnational, in this case by the INGOs involved in the 
litigation efforts). Although not without weaknesses and criticisms,9 the model 
provides a useful framework to analyze the development, movement, and growth of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 G. Goertz & P.F. Diehl, 'Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and 
Measurement Issues' (1992) 36(4) Journal of Conflict Resolution, pp. 634-64, at 661. 
7 T. Risse-Kappen, T. Risse, S.C. Ropp & K. Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999), at pp. 1-38. 
8 It has since been used to analyze responses to environmental justice issues (see, e.g., K. Hochstetler, 
'After the Boomerang: Environmental Movements and Politics in the La Plata River Basin' (2002) 2(4) 
Global Environmental Politics, pp. 35- 57. 
9	  See, e.g.,	  A. Jetschke & A. Liese, 'The Power of Human Rights a Decade After: From Euphoria to 
Contestation', in T. Risse, S. C. Ropp & K. Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: from 
Commitment to Compliance, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), at pp. 26-42.; R. Goodman & D. 
Jinks, 'Social Mechanisms to Promote International Human Rights', in T. Risse, S. C. Ropp & K. 
Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: from Commitment to Compliance, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), at pp. 103-122.; J. Snyder & L. Vinjamuri, 'Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice' (2004) 28(3) International Security, pp. 5-44.	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norms employed by DAPs, GoS, and the INGOs involved in the Merowe Dam 
struggle.  
  
7	  
	  
 
 
 
10 
The spiral model is adapted here to better understand responses to environmental 
mobilization (See Figure 2 - Decision Making within the Spiral Model). Zeitoun et 
al.11  studied the effects of the construction of the Merowe Dam on DAPs using 
notions of Environmental Justice (EJ) and concluded that such notions do not lend 
themselves to considerations of repressive responses to struggles by undemocratic 
governments. However, repression can itself be understood as one strategy from a set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Risse-Kappen, Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, ibid, at p. 20. 
11 M. Zeitoun, et al., 'A “Justice” Reading of the Trans-National Struggle of the People Displaced by 
the Merowe Dam' (2019) 24(2) Local Environment, pp. 129-45, at pp. 142-41. 
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of strategies open to utilization by governments which can include recognition as well 
as strategies of denial and partial accommodation through tactical concessions, as 
reflected in the basic form of the Spiral Model in Figure 1.  
The spiral model explains how international norms can be used as a pressure point to 
shift a government from repression and denial towards concessions and, eventually, 
rule consistent behaviour. Given the human rights context of the Spiral Model, the 
pressure exerted by transnational networks on non-responsive governments in this 
respect manifests in directing international public attention to a particular 
government’s violations and getting other states and international organizations to 
integrate concerns for respect for human rights in their dealings with the government 
in question.12 Bringing about litigation in international forums is an important tool 
that has been successfully utilized by transnational networks against authoritarian 
governments in Latin America in the 1970s and 80s.13 Traditionally, such litigation 
initiatives targeted non-responsive governments directly in order to reaffirm the 
validity of the international norms in question. The case brought in the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights against GoS is a classic example. We 
have also included an analysis of the case brought by the Justice Broker against the 
German company Lahmeyer as an example of litigation that brings about indirect 
pressure on the government and which also serves the purpose of raising public 
awareness of violations of international norms committed by the government. 
 
What has emerged from the Merowe struggle, however, presents a fascinating 
challenge to the Spiral Model. Here, GoS strategically and perhaps pre-emptively 
invoked strong international norms to justify actions that resulted in human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Risse-Kappen, Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, ibid. 
13 Ibid.	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abuses. Given this minimum level of internalization of norms, instead of dismissing 
the response of GoS to the environmental struggle against the Merowe Dam as an 
extension of its existing repressive practices, this analysis seeks to understand it as 
belonging to a continuum of acceptable and unacceptable responses, including violent 
repression.  
 
The Decision-Making Model in Figure 2 posits that the congruence or divergence in 
norms between the different actors (GoS, DAPs and INGOs) is determinative of their 
interaction with other actors. Given this underlying assumption, we opted to do a 
norm-mapping exercise in order to better understand the decision-making process by 
GoS.14 This theoretical framework also accommodates the possibility that the DAPs 
may at any given point accept the conceptualization of justice propounded by the 
Government or reject it (totally or partially) and resist it accordingly. Once the DAPs 
decide to resist, INGOs may decide to adopt the struggle or not to adopt it, depending 
on whether there is sufficient convergence between the two actors with respect to the 
norms they wish to give effect to. In the particular case of the Merowe Dam, the 
litigation INGOs involved worked within human rights frameworks that were then 
utilized in order to seed the resistance of the DAPs in its environmental context. We, 
therefore, found it necessary to explore the reasons for the adoption of this particular 
cause. The use of in-depth interviews in this research is geared towards understanding 
the motives of the actors involved and their perception of the struggle and the attitude 
of GoS.15 In order to develop a theoretical understanding of mobilization in this case, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 While semi-structured interviews with relevant government officials would have offered further 
corroboration of the evidence collected in the norm-mapping exercise, we are yet to gain access to GoS 
for this purpose. 
15 D. Della Porta, ‘In-Depth Interviews’ in D. Della Porta (ed.), Methodological Practices in Social 
Movement Research (OUP Oxford, 2014), pp. 228-261. 
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representative interviews of key-informants were sufficient even though further 
interviews would have offered better corroboration of the data. It is therefore 
suggested that further empirical testing of the tentative conclusions in this article 
would be a valuable contribution towards understanding mobilization in the particular 
case of the Merowe Dam.  
 
We were also interested in understanding whether the scaling up of the struggle by the 
Justice Broker who brought the two cases before the African Commission of Human 
and People’s Rights (ACHPR) and before the German courts is likely to give rise to 
new global environmental norms of environmental corporate responsibility. We hope 
that a better understanding of decision making- as per this theoretical framework- can 
inform international norm-development policies and the management of similar 
struggles by affected people, transnational networks and governments. 
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A note on Norm- Mapping: 
 
A growing body of literature examines norms through the lens of environmental 
justice and indeed focuses specifically on the struggles of populations affected by 
hydropower dams.16 Organizations such as the World Commission on Dams (WCD) 
are an example of collaborative efforts17 that can result in the setting and employing 
of norms which benefit all involved parties.18 As the most comprehensive and often-
cited norms of dam building, the WCD process ‘…can be regarded as an instance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  C. Bethoux and S. La Branche, 'The Internalization of Participation Norms by International 
Organizations: The Case of Sustainable Development and Dams' (2011) 67(1) International Journal, 
pp. 195-217.; U. Khatri, 'Indigenous Peoples' Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Context 
of State-Sponsored Development: The New Standard Set by Sarayaku V. Ecuador and Its Potential to 
Delegitimize the Belo Monte Dam' (2013) 29(1) American University International Law Review, pp. 
165-207.; P. Langley, 'Transparency in the Making of Global Environmental Governance' (2001) 
Global Society 15(1), pp. 73-92.; C. Okereke, 'Equity Norms in Global Environmental Governance' 
(2008) 8(3) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 25-50.	  
17 The WCD came into being in 2000 under the auspices of both the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the World Bank (WB) and included a broad-based consultation in 
which multiple stakeholders between proponents and opponents of large dams were involved (See 
Dingwerth, n 19 below for details).  
18 N. K. Dubash, 'Global Norms through Global Deliberation? Reflections on the World Commission 
on Dams' (2009) 15(2) Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
Organizations, pp. 219-38. 
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transnational rule-making that is functionally equivalent to multilateral environmental 
negotiations’.19 Despite their status as mere guidelines without binding effect, they 
have acquired a normative and discursive value in that departures from them may give 
rise to calls for justification.20 As such, reference will be made throughout this article 
to relevant WCD standards.  
In assessing the adherence to international norms of Dam building, the World Bank 
Operational Policies on Internal Displacement21 also provide a useful reference point 
against which we can assess the behaviour of GoS. These quasi-administrative 
standards are, strictly speaking, internal guidelines set up to ensure that the 
organization fulfils its own mandate of development and poverty alleviation when 
funding appropriate projects in borrower countries.22 However, the World Bank 
operational policies often consolidate and indicate the emergence and universality of 
certain benchmark practices related to dam construction even if the same are only 
sometimes legally binding, depending on whether they are incorporated in loan or 
credit agreements.23 There certainly seems to be a consensus that although the norms 
involved in dam building may lack ‘teeth’, they still matter and play an important 
role.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 K. Dingwerth, The New Transnationalism: Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy 
(Springer, 2007)., at p. 59. 
20 Ibid. 
21 The World Bank Operational Policy 4.12, adopted Dec 2001 and revised in Apr. 2013, available at: 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1572&ver=curr
ent, and the World Bank Operational Directive 4:30, adopted 1 June 1990, available at:  
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/322d9d80488559f584b4d66a6515bb18/OD430_InvoluntaryRes
ettlement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
22	  See B. Adams, Green Development: Environment and Sustainability in a Developing World 
(Routledge, 2008). and L. Boisson de Chazournes, 'Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank 
Operational Standards', in D. L. Shelton (ed) Commitment and Compliance: the Role of Non-binding 
forms in the International Legal System,  (Oxford University Press 2000)., pp. 281- 302. 
23 L. Boisson De Chazournes, ibid. 
24	  W. Scheumann and O. Hensengerth, Evolution of Dam Policies: Evidence from the Big Hydropower 
States (Springer Science & Business Media, 2014). and Dingwerth, n.19 above.	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Norms relating to dam construction operate on three different levels: international, 
national and local. The analysis of the Sudan Merowe Dam case suggests that 
different actors in environmental struggles focus on different norms drawn from six 
distinct clusters, namely: environmental/environmental justice, human rights, 
developmental, social and indigenous rights, corporate responsibility, and state 
powers. There is a measure of overlap between these categories, especially between 
environmental justice norms and human rights (e.g. participation and accountability) 
on which the framing of the environmental struggle by DAPs tended to coalesce. 
What becomes clear is that the landscape of norms is becoming increasingly crowded, 
and allows for what we term ‘norm shopping’ to justify positioning and related 
actions. Particularly in the field of environmental justice, there is extreme scope for 
multiple, competing, and/or overlapping norms. Rather than fostering more equitable 
and just outcomes, this leads to a confusing and complex backdrop, allowing for 
parallel trajectories. 
The integration of international norms on environmental protection, human rights and 
development and economic growth has been a serious challenge for the international 
community, which strove to bring them together through the concept of sustainable 
development. Following the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development,25 norms of sustainable development were codified in a number of 
international instruments26 culminating in the new Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) adopted in 2015.27 These initiatives, however, often understood the elements 
of sustainable development as independent yet mutually reinforcing, but not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 N. 31 below. 
26 N. Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning 
and Status, (Brill/Nijhoff 2009).   
27 UN General Assembly, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
21 Oct. 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/57b6e3e44.html. 
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necessarily interconnected, competing, conflicting or irreconcilable. For example, 
linking aid for developing countries to democratization assumes that achieving 
development in undemocratic contexts, while possible, is not as valuable as achieving 
it in contexts where human rights are protected. Similarly, by rejecting that 
development can be used as excuse for abridging human rights, the SDGs seem to 
juxtapose the two; thereby presupposing their independence form each other. . In the 
context of the Merowe Dam, Gos invoked the right to development, economic 
growth, access to energy and clean water not as justification for violating human 
rights but as a necessary means of achieving respect for them.  
The concept of sustainable development itself is multi-faceted and ‘…has come a 
long way from the original meaning of sustainable use of natural resources to one 
with more anthropocentric and…socio-economic substance’.28 However, it has 
developed in a piece-meal fashion and tended to evolve divergently depending on the 
over-arching purpose of a particular initiative and the interests of the main actors 
behind it. Noting the integration challenge inherent in the concept of sustainable 
development, Kent argues that the difficulty is in designing laws and policies that go 
beyond specific goals and strike a balance between various considerations from many 
fields.29 We, therefore, present our arguments regardless of the sustainable 
development framework, which we believe suffers from the same syndrome of 
fragmentation of international law discussed herein. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Schrijver, n. 25 above, at p. 217. 
29 A. Kent, ‘Implementing the principle of policy integration: institutional interplay and the role of 
international organizations’ (2014) 14(3) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, pp. 203-224. 
.	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3. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK IN SUDAN 
 
GoS created a number of administrative units both within its existing structure and 
additional to it to be in charge of the Merowe Dam Construction. The first unit 
created was the Merowe Dam Implementation Unit (MDIU), which existed under the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.30 This was later replaced by the Dam 
Implementation Unit (DIU), which was created to be under the direct supervision of 
the Office of the Presidency and not subject to the usual legal constraints applicable to 
administrative units within the executive branch.31 According to Scudder,32 parastates 
such as the DIU are the most logical institutional mechanisms for planning and 
implementing large-scale hydro power structures and they often enjoy the political 
backing as well as the direct involvement of the head of the state.33 What is unusual 
about the DIU seems to be both its exclusion from all scrutiny and the apparent 
classification of the unit and the Merowe Dam as a national security concern, as 
explained by all interviewees belonging to the DAPs. They stated that ‘The DIU 
behaved like a security apparatus’; ‘ [we were] struggling against an entity that is 
beyond law and scrutiny and that enjoy[ed] the protection of the state and its laws’; 
and ‘I was told by an editor of a newspaper that “the intelligence services regard the 
Merowe Dam issue as a red line. There can be no reporting on it whatsoever…”’34  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ali Askouri, Khazzān Al-Ḥammādāb: Namūzaj Al-Islam Al-Siyāsī Lil’ifqār Wa’nahb Al-Mawārid 
[the Hamadab Dam: The Political Islam Model for Impoverishment and the Expropriation of 
Resources], (Lithuania: AJSP Printing Services, 2014). 
31 Presidential Decree No (217) of 2005. 
32 T. Scudder, The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social Environmental, Institutional and 
Political Costs (Earthscan, London  2005). 
33 See for example the case of the MSLA in Sri-Lanka reported in Scudder, n. 31 above. 
34 Interviews with AM (15 Apr. 2017), AA (16 Apr. 2017) and AH (17 May  2017) respectively. 
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Notwithstanding the nature of the DIU, it is important to note national legislation 
exists which promulgates standards governing development projects in the country. 
The Environment Conservation (or Protection) Act (2001)35 (EPA Act) defines the 
functions of various Federal and State bodies with respect to ensuring environmental 
protection. Article 17 EPA Act places a clear obligation on all parties interested in 
projects likely to negatively affect the ‘environment or natural resources’ to submit an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) detailing project alternatives as well as 
actions planned to mitigate the negative effects of the project. Article 3 EPA Act 
defines the environment as inclusive of the social, cultural and livelihood systems in 
place. This definition clearly incorporates the norms of sustainable development 
promoted in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development36 and 
subsequent developments. Notable in this respect, however, is the absence of any 
procedural provisions to ensure transparency and adequate participation by 
stakeholders in decision making with respect to development projects in the EPA Act.  
 
In addition, Article 43 of the 2005 Interim Constitution37 guarantees the usual list of 
rights of citizens, including the right to own property and to not be divested from it 
‘…save by law in the public interest and in consideration of prompt and fair 
compensation’ (emphasis added). A combination of previous pieces of legislation had 
the same effect prior to the adoption of the Interim Constitution.38 Also relevant to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Sudan Environment Protection Act (EPA) (2001), vailable at 
https://www.resourcedata.org/dataset/rgi-sudan-environment-protection-act-2001/resource/b7b21c00-
019d-4e26-848b-fbcc27a68e71   
36 Adopted by the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 
June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 14 June 1992, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.	  
37	  The Interim Constitution National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (2005), available at 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/sd/sd003en.pdf.	  
38 The 1930 Land Acquisition Act together with the 1994 Civil Transactions Act and the Seventh 
Constitutional Decree of 1993 (Source Resettlement Policy Framework (the WB Project on Sustainable 
Livelihoods for Displaced and Vulnerable Communities in Eastern Sudan (2016)) 
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case of the Merowe Dam is the organization and recognition of land rights in Sudan. 
Askouri notes that, in addition to the above, there were 17 pieces of legislation 
specifically issued in relation to the construction of the dam.39  
 
4. RESETTLEMENT AND RESISTANCE 
 
The construction of the Merowe Dam by GoS in 2009 on the fourth cataract of the 
river Nile fully or partially submerged of 80% of a 250 kilometres (km) stretch along 
the banks of the Nile, from the North of Abu Hamad until the Hamadab area to the 
South of Nouri. The 67 metre-high dam has a reservoir of 174 km and a surface area 
of 400-800 square metres. The Dam Affected People (DAPs) inhabiting this area are 
understood to be 65% Manasir, 7% Hamdab and 28% of both Manasir and Hamdab 
who inhabit the area of Amri (hereinafter Amri). For historical reasons, the affected 
areas have sustained a somewhat independent existence from the centre and their 
inhabitants have been able to develop a self-sufficient agricultural economy despite 
inhospitable conditions and scarcity of agricultural lands.40 While the struggle of 
these communities against the Dam evolved as issues of resettlement and 
compensation became obvious grounds for conflict, the locals initially saw the 
construction of the Dam itself as a welcome development and a promise for further 
economic growth in the area.42 In addition, and because of the challenging conditions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Askouri, n. 29 above. 
40 Ibid.; and Mohammad Jalal Hashim, Risālat Kajbār: Min Ajl Al-Sūdān, Lā Min Ajl Qaryah: Qaḍāya 
Al-Sudūd Fil’sūdān [the Message of Kajbār: For the Sake of Sudan, Not a Village: Issues of Dams in 
the Sudan.] (London: Shafuq.com, 2016). 
42 Askouri, n.29 and Hashim, n. 39 above. 
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in the area, most communities were initially receptive to the idea of resettlements and 
were duly engaged by GoS in talks regarding possible sites for relocation.43 
Despite the fact of shared concerns of and demands by the affected groups’, GoS’ 
response to each group’s mobilization effort differed markedly. The Hamdab 
inhabited the area closest to the Dam and were resettled first. Their experience was 
characterized by very limited resistance and, in general, a failure to stave off the 
efforts of the central government to uproot their communities in favour of 
constructing the Merowe Dam. However, their early resettlement had a profound 
effect on the trajectory of the Amri and Manasir struggles, which followed from 2005 
onward.44 Both groups lost trust in GoS early on in their struggles, organized and 
coordinated their efforts efficiently and assumed unwavering positions with respect to 
acceptable terms for resettlement. In addition, and as explained by the Hamdab 
activist, ‘[i]n 2003, the government had a stronger hold in terms of internal security. 
Amri and Manasir benefited from the conflict between the Islamists over power. And 
the internet and telecommunications boom also made a difference.’45 
The subsequent failure of the Amri struggle, juxtaposed against the evident success of 
the Manasir struggle, demonstrates the failure of the Spiral Model to capture the 
effects of mobilization in a country like Sudan. The Amri group inhabited an area 
down stream from the Hamdab and was the second group to be resettled followed by 
Manasir who inhabit the are much further removed from the Dam. While the Amri 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Activists from both the Manasir and Hamdab groups stated that they were engaged in talks with GoS 
as early as the 1990s: ‘“Committees were formed as early as the 1990s to look into possible 
resettlement locations…We started talking to the implementation unit since the mid 1990s.’ (AM 
Interview, 15 Apr. 2017);‘“I was involved in talks regarding resettlement from the early 1990s in my 
capacity as Chair of the Hamdab Student Body’ (AH Interview, 17 May  2017).	  
44 Askouri n. 29 above and Hashim n. 39 above. 
45 AH Interview, 17 May 2017. 
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communities consistently reached out to transnational networks and international 
NGOs, the Manasir Executive Council (MEC) adopted a more accommodating 
approach towards GoS that ultimately worked given the political climate as explained 
by AM who stated, ‘[w]e have to use whatever tools are available to us; patience, 
manipulation, negotiation.’46In a clear departure from the predictions of the Spiral 
Model, the ability of Manasir to negotiate effectively with GoS can hardly be 
attributed to transnational mobilization and have resulted instead from a unique set of 
internal political dynamics.  
Hildyard notes that the Hamdab resettlement package was a total failure given the 
poor soil and the inadequacy of basic infrastructure and facilities in the new 
villages.47 According to Bosshard and Hildyard, the poverty rate in the population 
increased from 10% to 65% in the two years of resettlement.48 By 2009, the irrigation 
scheme in the area had failed completely and farmers were forced to spend from their 
own pockets to affect workaround solutions. The failure of the Hamdab resettlement 
was hardly unexpected, with representatives of the group informing GoS as early as 
2002 that the designated location was not suitable and insisting on the readiness of 
projects as a pre-condition to relocation.49 In order to manage the situation, GoS 
resorted to a number of coercive measures aimed at deflating the Hamdab resistance. 
As explained by Hamdab activist, ‘[t]he government exerted all sorts of pressures to 
induce people to move including excessive taxation on crops and means of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 AM Interview, 15 Apr. 2017. 
47 Nicholas Hildyard, 'Neutral? Against What? Bystanders and Human Rights Abuses: The Case of 
Merowe Dam' (2008) 37 Sudan Studies, pp. 19-38. 
48 P. Bosshard and N. Hildyard, 'A Critical Juncture for Peace, Democracy, and the Environment: 
Sudan and the Merowe/Hamadab Dam Project' (2005) A report published by the International Rivers 
Network and The Coroner House, USA. 
49 Askouri, n. 29 above. This was supported by the Hamdab activist who stated that “The Hamdab 
unanimously rejected Al-Multaga as a resettlement option, because of the obvious risk of 
desertification in the area.” (AH Interview, 17 May 2017). 
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production. They also infiltrated our committees and arrested activists. We had no 
option but to move’50  
The resettlement of the Amri group proved even more problematic and has since 
formed a part of the two litigation initiatives discussed in section 5.2 below. Conflict 
erupted in 2006 between the group and the body in charge of the implementation and 
construction of the Merowe Dam (the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) over property 
surveys conducted in the area between 2003-2006 for the purposes of determining 
compensation packages and resettlement entitlements. This culminated in an 
unprovoked attack by the police on peaceful protestors gathered to discuss further 
action regarding the negotiations with the DIU on 22 April 2006. The attack resulted 
in three deaths and thirteen casualties. Later in the year, Amri villages were flooded 
without warning, following a decision by the Dam authorities to close the dam gates 
during the high-rise season. In their 2006 letter of complaint to the United Nations 
(UN) Special Rapporteur for Adequate Housing, the committee representing the 
demands of the Amri people (the Amri Committee) characterized the incident as ‘a 
deliberate strategy by the Dam Implementation Unit and the Government of Sudan to 
force the Amri communities to accept a resettlement package that they have up to date 
rejected’.51 In addition, and following the reluctant acquiescence of the Amri people 
to be resettled in accordance with the project plans, it became apparent that the DIU 
grossly underestimated their numbers and needs. Consequently, over 1360 families 
remained without housing.  
The initial kernel of the conflict between the Amri community and GoS was adequate 
compensation. However, by 2008 -- and perhaps because they were emboldened by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 AH Interview, 17 May 2017. 
51 The letter is reproduced in Askouri, n.29 above, at p.792. 
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the gains the Manasir achieved in their fight for recognition of the local option -- 750 
families decided to resettle back on the banks of the Hamdab lake in old Amri to 
avoid the dire conditions in the new resettlement projects.53 This was confirmed by 
the activist from Amri, who stated ‘“After the flooding, families were forced to move 
to these unsuitable resettlement areas…many of them had since returned to old Amri 
and the focus has changed to rehabilitating the old villages’”54  
It is not entirely clear when the first conflict between the last of the three affected 
groups (Manasir) and GoS occurred. However, it is likely to have been instigated by a 
disagreement between the Manasir and the DIU with respect to assessing 
compensation and resettlement options for those affected pursuant to the Presidential 
Decree on Resettlement and Compensation of the Merowe Dam Affected 
Communities of 2002. Askouri estimates the start of the conflict at some time during 
2004.55 However, the issuance of Presidential Decree No (277) in September 2003,56 
which prepared for the recognition of the Manasir local option (the option to remain 
in the un-submerged lands around the lake) by re-vesting the ownership of the 
Manasir lands in the River Nile State, indicates that a conflict of some sort had 
already arisen and was being negotiated. In any event, GoS, once more, focused on 
ensuring that those representing the groups would be amenable to its own agenda.57 
The community eventually formed the Manasir Executive Committee (MEC); 
members of which were elected by each village in the area. As explained by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Hashim, n. 39 above. 
54 AA Interview, 16 Apr. 2017). 
55 Askouri, n. 29 above. 
56 Reproduced in Askouri, ibid, at p. 791  
57 Askouri, n. 29 above. 
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Manasir activist: ‘“The DIU wanted particular people to deal with…they did not 
accept the chosen representatives and refused to recognize the duly elected MEC.’58 
In any event, as early as 2004 the now representatively-constituted MEC wrote to 
both the DIU and the financiers and companies building the dam to stop work on the 
resettlement projects until a plan for resettlement (including an assessment of the 
local option) and compensation were agreed. By the end of 2005, the relationship 
between the MEC and the DIU had considerably deteriorated, perhaps precipitated by 
the earlier experience of the Hamdab group which suffered significantly as a result of 
agreeing to the DIU’s plan for resettlement. According to the Manasir activist: 
‘People lost faith in the DIU, because it refused to recognize the representative MEC 
and had misinformed the people and were not forthcoming with information about the 
resettlement projects.’59  
2005 was also a politically sensitive year for the ruling party in Khartoum. In addition 
to the conditions in Darfur and the international attention to the ethnic cleansing in the 
region,60 that year witnessed the successful signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement61 (CPA) between GoS and the Sudan People Liberation Movement; then 
the opposition group leading the fight in the South of the country for decades. The 
CPA guaranteed a number of political freedoms and there was a general sense of a 
permissive political climate. This had undoubtedly made the GoS in Khartoum weary 
of possible challengers. Askouri suggests that the MEC - dominated by the Popular 
Congress Party (PCP), which broke away from the ruling National Congress Party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 AM Interview, 15 Apr. 2017. 
59 Ibid. 
60 These events are the subject matter of UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (S/RES/1593) of 31 
March 2005 referring the situation in Darfurto the International Criminal Court for investigation, 
available at:  https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Darfur%20SRES1593.pdf. 
61 Available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/SudanCPA.pdf. 
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(NCP) in 1998 – may have made GoS especially nervous given the conditions on the 
ground.62 He explains that, ‘[t]he split in Islamist rows both benefited and 
disadvantaged the Manasir struggle. It was beneficial because it provided impetus for 
the PCP to organize for the case and against the government. It was also useful 
because members of the PCP had inside information about the project. But the split 
also caused a division between people in the communities.’63The GoS’ conception of 
the various dynamics in play is summarised by Ibrahim Mahmud Hamid, the Minister 
of Humanitarian Affairs; who stated that the affected people ‘…think that even the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement may affect them, that a new government will come 
and solve things for them.’ He also added that ‘Some groups in the opposition want to 
use [the Merowe Dam matter] as a political issue.’64 
This charged atmosphere between the MEC and the DIU almost resulted in an armed-
confrontation in Sani Valley in November 2005. Shortly afterwards, the Presidential 
Decree No (70) of 200665 was issued recognizing the MEC and providing the basis 
for recognizing the Manasir local option, which was later given effect to by the Nile 
State Governor in Decree No 37.66A number of other decrees were issued by the Nile 
State to implement the local option and postpone work on the resettlement projects 
until the local option resettlement started. By June 2006, the Manasir were signing an 
agreement with the Nile State to affirm the above decrees. This period of the Manasir 
interaction with GoS is characterized by tug-of-war patterns that do not lend 
themselves to seamless analysis. It could be the case that GoS negotiated with the 
Manasir when it had to and otherwise resorted to the same coercive and oppressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Askouri, n.29 above. 
63 JB Interview, 7 May, 2017. 
64 Interview- with Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Minister, Sudan Tribune, 20 May 2005, available at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article9680.  
65 Reproduced in Askouri, n. 29 above, at p. 804. 
66 On file with author.	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practices it used with the other groups when it could. According to the Manasir 
activist: ‘In 2006, the new Nile State Governor recognized the MEC as representative 
of the Manasir, possibly because of fear over security escalations in the area. This, 
despite the fact that the DIU continued to reject the MEC.’67  
Despite the gains made by the MEC, an armed forces under the command of the DIU 
were once more sent to the Manasir area in March 2007 to terrorize the people into 
surrendering to the DIU’s terms of resettlement following its violation of the Nile 
State Governor’s decrees, which called for halting work on the resettlement projects 
until an agreement is reached. The events culminated in a showdown between the two 
sides when the Manasir held the DIU force hostage in the Kurbukan Valley. The 
situation diffused only with the mediation of members of the MEC, who were later 
themselves taken to jail over the incident.68 This was followed by another agreement 
between the Manasir and GoS in May 2007 (the Friendship Hall Agreement), which 
promised to implement the local option for Manasir and called for a property survey 
to be carried out for purposes of assessing compensation. By August 2008, the 
Manasir land was intentionally flooded before the survey of property, was conducted. 
The difficulties in the relationship between the DIU and the MEC notwithstanding, 
Askouri suggests that with the issuance of Presidential Decree No (70) on 8 April 
2006,69 the Manasir struggle had already succeeded.70 This is because the decree 
returned the lands to the affected people (via the Nile State), recognized the local 
option as well as the authority of the MEC, which by then embodied a true 
representation of the local sentiment on the Merowe Dam. Current Manasir demands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 AM, Interview, 15 Apr. 2017. 
68 Askouri n. 29 above and Hashim n. 39 above. 
69 Ibid, n. 64 above. 
70 Askouri n. 29 above. 
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include access to electricity and water facilities, the construction of a road that can 
serve the area, and the establishment of agricultural and fish-farming projects capable 
of sustaining the needs of the locals.71  
 
 
 
 
 
5. RESPONSES TO MOBILIZATION EFFORTS 
AGAINST THE MEROWE DAM 
 
5.1 Norm shopping 
 
Succinctly, GoS is invoking norms based on development and economic growth to 
justify the building of hydropower dams and the adoption of a national plan of 
environmental management that calls for population redistribution, natural resource 
management, economic management, land ownership, and urban planning. 
Additionally, GoS has been seen to strategically ‘blame’ other international norms for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Interview with AM, 15 Apr. 2017. 
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any domestic failings; such as those giving rise to trade embargos, international 
sanctions, and foreign debt.73  
There is a marked dissonance between categories of international norms relating to 
environmental protection, development and human rights.74 On some issues, the 
conflict exists within self-contained groupings of international norms, as is the case 
when different actors use environmental justice references to justify different goals. 
For example, there is clear evidence of water resource management for developing 
countries being prioritized as an element of environmental justice on the international 
level.75 This allows GoS to invoke environmental justice considerations to fend off 
criticism over dam construction.76 While it is acknowledged that building dams to 
facilitate water resource management gives rise to concerns over distributive justice, 
the logic of the need for dams to guarantee water resources for a growing population 
is sound.77  
Generally, development norms such as access to sustainable energy, economic growth 
and access to technology, tend to encapsulate the GoS approach more than any other 
normative framework.78 GoS invokes these norms very regularly to justify dam 
projects, stating that the development of large scale dams will lead to the reduction of 
population level poverty, will increase access to power and urbanisation, and will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 These conclusions have been drawn from a large scale review of several years’ of UN reports, from 
both GoS and various UN bodies.  A full list of the reviewed documents can be obtained from the 
authors on demand. 
74 E. Z. Bratman, 'Contradictions of Green Development: Human Rights and Environmental Norms in 
Light of Belo Monte Dam Activism' (2014) 46(2)  Journal of Latin American Studies, pp. 261-89. 
75 SDGs, WCD and Global Compact for Sustainable Energy: A Framework for Business Action 2011 
(NBI strategic paper). 
76 See Universal Periodic Report of Sudan to the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
2016. 
77 A. Wutich, A. Brewis, A. M. York and R. Stotts, 'Rules, Norms, and Injustice: A Cross-Cultural 
Study of Perceptions of Justice in Water Institutions' (2013) 26(7) Society & Natural Resources, pp. 
795-809. 
78	  SDGs, WCD and Global Compact for Sustainable Energy: A Framework for Business Action 2011 
(NBI strategic paper).	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harness the latest technology and research to improve environmental outcomes. The 
government’s rhetoric also emphasizes access to sustainable resources and the 
prevention of desertification, disaster preparedness and flood protection as 
justifications for its dam projects79. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has additionally 
invoked human rights and development norms to justify water management projects.80 
In like fashion, GoS explicitly referred to dam construction as an example of fulfilling 
the people’s right to development in some cases.81 Still, despite the utilization of the 
normative claims proffered to justify the GoS programme of dam construction, it has 
been suggested that dam construction is seen as an alternative to oil production 
following the cessation of the South82 and that its aim is the further consolidation of 
the hegemonic control of the regime.83 
The DAPs, in turn, focus on norms surrounding livelihoods, housing, and 
participation.84 Finally, transnational NGOs have drawn heavily on indigenous rights, 
freedom of assembly, and accountability when formulating their litigation strategies.85 
This was at times also reflected in the DAPs formulation of the struggle: 
The case of the Manasir at its core is a case of a struggle for land. The political aspect of this 
is the right to self-determinations. The Manasir, unlike Amri and Hamdab, is a tribe unto itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Sudan National Action Programme (SNAP) A Framework For Combating Desertification In Sudan 
in The Context Of The United Nations Convention To Combat Desertification (2006, Republic of 
Sudan Ministry Of Agriculture And Forestry National Drought And Desertification Control unit 
(NDDCU); UN convention to combat desertification, 1994.	  
80 Nile Basin Initiative, Briefing Note 8: Restoring the Nile Basin, May 2015. 
81	  Resettlement Policy Framework (the WB project on Sustainable Livelihoods for Displaced and 
Vulnerable Communities in Eastern Sudan), 2016.	  
82 Harry Verhoeven and Luke A Patey, "Sudan's Islamists and the Post Oil Era: Washington's Role 
after Southern Secession," Middle East Policy 18.3 (2011). 
83 H. Verhoeven, 'The Rise and Fall of Sudan's Al-Ingaz Revolution: The Transition from Militarised 
Islamism to Economic Salvation and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (2013) 15(2) Civil Wars, 
pp. 118-40. 
84 This information was gleaned from the initial reports from the DAPs, primarily from the first letter to 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Housing and early litigation documentation.   
85 The normative framework utilised by the transnational groups was illustrated by official reports and 
informal discussions as well as litigation documents accessed through the activists. 
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and you cannot be a tribe if you do not have a tribal land. It was the local people who 
formulated the issue as one of tribal honour in defending tribal lands.86 
 
Having said that, it is interesting to note that in the case of the Merowe Dam the 
affected people and the government converged on the need for development and 
economic growth, which were not necessarily seen as posing a direct threat to the 
relationship of the affected people with the land. This is not usually the case in 
conflicts over dam construction.88 
People in the area were for the construction of the dam. We did not want to 
deprive the country from the general benefit brought by the dam provided our 
demands are met.89 
People did not oppose the expropriation of lands for the public interest, but 
compensation is essential.90 
The story of the dam is in the consciousness of the people in the area. The 
people here were expecting a dam and with it development to the area… We 
had no problem negotiating over a project that is in the public interest. The 
problem was that we were completely marginalized and excluded from this 
benefit and that someone else was making decisions about our lives.91 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  JB,	  Interview	  7	  May	  2017.	  
88 See Scudder, n. 31 above. 
89 AM, Interview 15 Apr. 2017. 
90 AH, Interview17 May 2017. 
91 AA, Interview 16 Apr. 2017.  
	  
29	  
	  
On another level, DAPs take issue with the absence of participation opportunities 
guaranteed in a number of international instruments, including those that have 
subsequently formed part of national policies.92 In its 2011 Universal Periodic Review 
submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, GoS explained how the country had paid 
attention to the environmental dimension of development and the enactment of 
legislation, laws and regulations to protect the environment. It also mentioned its 
accession to a number of international conventions protecting the environment and the 
creation of environmental tribunals throughout the country.93 Even though the EIA for 
the Merowe Dam did not in fact include any social impact assessment, the 
government maintained that ‘Feasibility studies had been conducted prior to the 
initiation of dam construction works to ensure that the views of persons affected by 
the projects were taken into account’.94 Yet, the following excerpts from government 
officials and experts are indicative of the generally dismissive attitude of the concerns 
of DAPs: 
 [Addressing representatives of the affected people]…another problem is this 
focus on agriculture. It is not essential that people relocate from their flooded 
area to work in agriculture. They can work in mining, fishing or other 
industries. Why restrict people to one livelihood source?95 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See the Sudan National Comprehensive Strategy of 1992-2002. 
93	  Read together, the EPA 2001, the Interim Constitution 2005 and Sudan’s National Water Policy of 
1999 show that citizens have the right to live in a clean environment, and that the protection and 
conservation of national resources including water is a priority. The EPA adopts the language of 
sustainable development as reflected in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992). 
In addition, the Interim Constitution addresses environmental and human rights concerns including 
with respect to displacement and provides for the protection of property rights	  
94 56th Session of CESCR. Note that the EIA referred to was never made available to the public (See 
Askouri, n. 27 above).	  
95 Sa’addin Ibrahim Contributor to Hamdab, Makabrab and Local Option Studies, Chair of Al-Multaga 
Option Study (Workshop held 22 August 2016 in Sudan) 
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[The relocated communities] had the deal of their lives. [The government] 
gives them big pieces of land; they build new houses for them.96 
 
 
I think this is one of the best-organised projects with the best-organised 
response for those that have been affected…I have been there to see their 
places, they have proper houses, they have proper facilities, they have farms, 
everything. And even it is better than the old villages. They have been 
compensated generously.97 
One of the major points of conflict between GoS and populations affected by the 
Merowe Dam is the issue of forced displacement. The WB Operational Policy on 
Internal Displacement recognizes that in some exceptional cases displacement is 
necessary. This was also echoed in the national Guidelines of Internal Displacement 
(1999), which provide for an exception where the displacement is justified by 
compelling and overriding public interest. The difficulty, naturally, is in defining the 
‘overriding public interest’. It is hard to dispute that, although the government has 
formulated a National Policy on the Internally Displaced (2009) that places on it an 
obligation to ‘prevent causes of displacement’,98 GoS seems to act on a presumption 
of the government’s entitlement to displace populations regularly.99 It has indeed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Abdelhalim Al-Mutaafi (Governor of Khartoum) interview in Financial Times 6 March 2007. 
97 Ibrahim Mahmud Hamid, Sudan Minister of Humanitarian Affairs on Merowe Dam (Sudan Tribune 
Interview, 21 May 2005). 
98 Article 8, paragraph 2. 
99 See Presidential Decree No (353) of 2002 on appropriating lands affected by the Merowe Dam. The 
Decree relies on Art. 43 of the 1998 Constitution and The Appropriation of Land Act of 1930. 
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expressed its belief that displacement may be necessary to open up usable land.100 
Whether the use by GoS of population displacement to meet its economic growth is 
compliant with national law is a debatable point.101 However, the lack of effective 
accountability measures prevents this apparent conflict between developmental and 
human rights norms from ever being debated and resolved at the national level.102 
5.2 Seeking Accountability in International and Regional Forums  
 
The Spiral Model as modified for the purpose of this study predicts (or maps) the 
involvement of transnational networks following governmental repression of 
domestic opposition. The opposition enlists the help of international NGOs and actors 
within such networks in order to affect some sort of pressure on unresponsive 
governments to change their policies with respect to violations of accepted norms. In 
the same spirit, Ali Askouri as the ‘Justice Broker’ in this case study utilized his 
connections with the outside world to bring two cases concerning the Merowe Dam in 
Germany and before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) respectively.103 The first of these cases, brought before the public 
prosecutor in Germany against the German company Lahmeyer International, which 
consulted on the Merowe Dam project, was of particular importance both to the 
justice broker and the affected communities. The litigation in Germany was led by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Sustainable Livelihoods For Displaced And Vulnerable 
Communities In Eastern Sudan – SLDP, Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), 
February 2016. 
101 Sustainable Livelihoods for Displaced and Vulnerable Communities in Eastern Sudan (SLDP) - 
Final Evaluation Report Prepared by EDGE for consultancy & research 
102 Note the concern expressed by the ACHPR (2012) on the lack of access to the judiciary and 
censorship. 
103 Askouri is active within a wide transnational network of dam activists around the World (JB 
Interview, 7 May 2017). 
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single NGO; the Eurpoean Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), 
and in the African Commission by a consortium of litigation NGOs. 
ECCHR and Askouri v. Senior Employees of Lahmeyer International  
 
In May 2010, ECCHR submitted a criminal complaint against two senior employees 
at Lahmeyer International to the public prosecutor in Frankfurt am Main in the 
German Bundesland of Hessen. The complaint contended the complicity of senior 
employees of the company in the flooding of more than 30 villages and the 
displacement of over 4,700 families and the destruction of their livelihoods. In April 
2011, the German prosecutor opened a formal investigation against three suspects and 
heard evidence from several witnesses.104In investigating the incidents of flooding of 
the Amri and Manasir lands in 2006 and 2008 respectively, the prosecutor mainly 
relied on section 313(1) of the German Criminal Code105 which states that 
‘Whosoever causes a flood and thereby endangers the life or limb of another person 
or property of significant value belonging to another shall be liable to imprisonment 
from one to ten years’. Additional offences were also identified, including 
abandonment of a person in a defenseless situation, consequently threatening his life 
(section 221(1), criminal damage of another's property (s.303 (1)) destruction of 
buildings (s.305(2), using threats or force to cause a person to do, suffer or omit an act 
(s.240(1)) as well as infringement of s.17 of the animal protection act.106 Discussing 
the legal basis under which the investigation was brought, the ECCHR representative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See case report available at: https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Case%20Report%20Lahmeyer_20151127.pdf. 
105 Available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/. 
106 Sources of the information regarding the legal basis for the case are the final decision of the 
prosecutor which was forwarded to us by ECCHR and the interview with their representative. 
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interviewed for this study explained that ‘No one has applied [these sections of the 
German Criminal Code dealing with flooding] to an extra-territorial case before’.107 
 
The crux of the complaint was that, in both incidents of flooding, the resettlement 
agreements and plans had not yet been finalized and some communities had not yet 
been resettled, but the flooding took place anyway as part of the planned schedule for 
construction of the dam. The complaint contended that those in charge at Lahmeyer 
had prior knowledge that the floods they provoked and approved would destroy the 
villages.108 From the account of the Justice Broker, the underlying complaint is that 
the communities were intentionally flooded out when they refused to agree to the 
unfair resettlement propositions, and that the Lahmeyer employees were complicit in 
the actions of GoS due to their position as consultants on the project and their expert 
knowledge of the dam construction business. The complaint also highlighted issues of 
corporate corruption and the systematic use of force to displace affected populations. 
Both the French partner company Alstom and Lahmeyer were previously implicated 
in cases of bribery and the use of force in similar projects.109 
The complaint was eventually dismissed on the 20 April 2016, because there was no 
evidence to conclude that the accused knew of the displacement of the Amri and 
Manasir and deliberately harmed them or knew and accepted that they should be 
affected by the flooding. In coming to this decision, the prosecutor took on notice the 
fact that the contract between Lahmeyer and the DIU did not extend to responsibility 
over displacement and that Lahmeyer had no control over the timing of the closing of 
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  Claudia Mueller-Hoff Interview, 30 May 2017.	  
108 From the account of the justice broker as set out in his witness statement as shared by him. 
109 See J. Stempel, ‘U.S. Judge Sentences Alstom in Bribery Case, $772 Mln Fine’, Reuters, 13 Nov. 
2015, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/alstom-corruption-sentencing-
idUSL1N13820V20151113; and K. Guha, ‘German Group Put on Graft Blacklist’, Financial Times, 25 
Feb. 2007, available at:	  https://www.ft.com/content/27577430-c503-11db-b110-000b5df10621. 	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the dam, which was agreed upon in the contract between the DIU and the Chinese 
construction consortium. The prosecutor was also of the opinion that there was 
insufficient evidence that flooding had been caused by omission. This opinion, too, 
was founded on the company’s contract with the DIU and the risks expressly assumed 
by Lahmeyer. 
This case had to take into consideration the content of the provisions of the German 
Code, based on which  the complaint was brought before the courts. The complaint 
also invoked international standards for the construction of dams and resettlement but 
did, however, acknowledge that these standards do not amount to enforceable law.110 
Additionally, even though Corporate Social Responsibility norms were not directly 
invoked, the central themes of the case focused on the idea of a duty of care and 
professional diligence.  
The decision of the prosecutor in fact did not make any mention of international 
norms. However, it did refer to the Sudanese municipal Law of Resettlement and 
Compensation of People Affected by the Construction of Merowe Dam of 2002 in the 
context of the fact that the EIA conducted by Lahmeyer did not include a resettlement 
plan. Nonetheless, the prosecutor was of the opinion that, as this Law had become 
effective in the same year, this lack of a resettlement plan could not be used to prove 
that the accused knew about the circumstances surrounding the delayed 
resettlement. The decision to dismiss the case against Lahmeyer, therefore, affirms 
the importance of national laws beyond their direct influence on decisions and 
strategies for mobilization. Zeitoun et al observed that rather than relying on a host of 
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  The complaint included reference to	  ‘internationally generally recognizable standards in industry’ 
and the ‘fulfilment of these standards [as being] part of the professional diligence of all stakeholders in 
projects which make resettlement procedures necessary’.	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available international norms, mobilization over the Merowe Dam focused primarily 
on issues of compensation and dignity seemingly drawn from national frameworks.111 
This decision further indicates that for the indirect effect of transnational mobilization 
on behaviour of governments to occur as per the Spiral Model, it is essential that a 
minimum level of environmental (and other) protection already exist in national 
legislation. This makes the theory advanced by the Spiral Model a tautology in this 
case, since the little protection that is available was the result of prior internalization 
of international environmental norms. 
The legal parameters within which the complaint had to be brought also meant that 
certain issues could not be specifically pleaded or relied upon. This was the case, for 
example, for suggestions that, in the light of the country’s political climate, GoS was 
unlikely to uphold human rights in the process of dam construction, as explained by 
the justice broker in the following excerpt: 
I wanted to make the point that by 2003 and because of the massive violations 
in Darfur, it was not reasonable for Lahmeyer to expect the Government of 
Sudan to affect the resettlement of the affected people in a fair, just and 
transparent way. This is in addition to the incidents of the wilful killing of 
Amri people in 2006 which were not specifically pleaded in the case.112 
Following the dismissal of the case, ECCHR has called for legal reforms. According 
to the NGO, the prosecutor applied had an unduly restrictive test to the issue of intent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Zeitoun et al, n 10, at p. 137. 
112 JB Interview, 7 May 2017. 
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as relevant to culpability113Despite the eventual collapse of the investigation, bringing 
the case was in itself quite significant on a number of fronts. The ECCHR 
representative stated that at the time of accepting the case ‘…no thematic areas of 
focus had developed yet [for the NGO]. This case contributed to the focus of the 
organization.’114She also expressed her personal expectations regarding the 
development of the case as follows: 
I was hoping that the German prosecutor would investigate the case so there 
would be a discussion on the criminal responsibility of German companies…a 
political discussion.115 
In addition to corporate responsibility under German criminal law, ECCHR is 
interested in issues of victim participation in proceedings and state responsibility for 
the regulation of the activities of domestic companies abroad. 
Although test cases can contribute meaningfully to our understanding of norms, 
especially in the context of corporate responsibility, the success of the strategy from 
the point of view of the people affected was questioned: 
 Given the current status of international law, it is a waste of time [for the 
affected local communities] to attempt to pursue justice against international 
companies...These communities cannot change this. But, international NGOs 
should organise campaigns to change these laws and to establish specific, 
simple and clear procedures that allow communities negatively affected by the 
work of these companies to bring them to account at minimum cost. Such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 From a previous briefing note that was posted on https://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/business-and-
human-rights/lahmeyer-case.html. 
114 Claudia Mueller-Hoff Interview, 30 May 2017. 
115 Ibid.	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efforts should be supported by a specified budget and there should be a 
specific court to look into these issues like the International Criminal Court.116  
Ali Askouri and Another (on behalf of the Persons Affected by the Construction of the 
Merowe and Kajbar Dams) vs. Sudan (2015- Present) 
The second litigation initiative is the case brought by a number of human rights 
litigation NGOs (the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), the Cairo 
Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) and the Center for the Study of Law, 
Justice, and Society (Dejusticia)) against the government of Sudan before the 
ACHPR.117 The complaint concerns multiple violations committed in the course of 
the construction of the Merowe Dam as well as the planned construction of the Kajbar 
Dam and was brought in the name of the Justice Broker and other individuals from 
the affected communities. At the time of writing, a decision by ACHPR was still 
pending. This case seems to have been born out of an interest in the institutional 
potential of ACHPR and as part of a wider North African litigation initiative to use 
the existing infrastructure to advance jurisprudence on human and political rights.118 
Under the procedural rules of ACHPR, parties to a complaint are under a strict 
confidentiality obligation, which remains in place until a decision is eventually made. 
In addition, the gestation period for cases can be as long as seven years and it is 
common for governments not to comply with the decisions of the Commission. The 
effect of these institutional features is two fold: (i) efforts to study the case in greater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 JB Interview, 7 May 2017. 
117 EIPR works on rights and freedoms in Egypt, and engages in strategic litigation before the African 
Court and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights.  CIHRS, also based in Egypt, works 
regionally across the Arab states and holds consultative status at the UN and observer status in the 
African Commissioner.  Dejusticia is a Colombian based applied research centre engaging in strategic 
litigation and has experience in working with dam affected populations. 
118 NGO representative Interview, 9 May 2017. 
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depth are complicated by the confidentiality obligation; and (ii) the fact that a case 
was brought against GoS as well as any details of the litigation cannot be used to seed 
the struggle and advocate for it while a decision is pending .119 
Given the framework of the African Charter and the space allowed by the 
Commission to bring about a broadly formulated complaint,120 we expect pleadings in 
the case to coalesce around displacement leading to loss of homes, land, and property 
(economic rights), environmental degradation (environmental rights, environmental 
justice), arbitrary killings and arrests as well as limited freedom of expression, 
assembly, and political participation and most importantly lack of access to justice 
(civil and political rights). We are also informed that the Kajbar Dam context enlists 
concerns over indigenous rights and social and cultural recognition. It is in this 
context that the lack of free and informed consent (FPIC) on the expropriation of land 
from indigenous people is likely to be raised. The case presents a good opportunity to 
examine formulation of the struggle over dam construction in a shared forum but 
given the different contexts of those affected by the Kajbar Dam (indigenous people) 
and the communities affected by the Merowe Dam:121  
 [The complaint] is very much set up as an indigenous peoples’ rights case, 
because the framework has a lot of resonance in human rights law and there is 
already some openness to the application of that framework which grew up in 
the Inter-American system…Because we are dealing with one community that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Ibid.	  	  
120‘ What is positive about the African Commission compared to other bodies is that you can bring in a 
big-picture problem …[that addresses] a number of different events over an extended period of time 
and that relate to the construction of two dams’. (NGO representative Interview, 9 May 2017). 
121 In similar cases adjudicated before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), the rights 
afforded to indigenous people were extended, at least in part, to other communities affected by the 
construction of dams (See e.g. Saramaka v, Suriname (IACtHR, 12 Aug. 2008) and Moiwana v. 
Suriname (IACtHR 15 Jun. 2005). 
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is more clearly Nubian, that would fit in quite without controversy in the 
rights framework. But, then we have another community in the case of 
Merowe who do not identify that way. So there is conflict there but the 
framing has evolved to saying that this is about the displacement of people 
because of an international product and it is not the case that the people have 
to fit into a particular box to determine that their rights have been violated.122 
A number of international norms likely to be invoked include adequate compensation 
for the loss of livelihoods, land and income-generating property like palm trees. We 
also expect norms that made an earlier appearance in the communication of the Amri 
community with the UN Special Rapporteur for Adequate Housing, such as the right 
to health, to feature. The African Charter includes express provisions on the right to 
property, health and a private family life (read as guaranteeing a right to housing).124 
Given the framework of indigenous rights, we expect a utilization of the right to 
cultural development in Article 22 of the Charter and perhaps claims of loss of culture 
as linked to the loss of land. Despite the focus on indigenous rights, and because of 
the substantial jurisprudence of the Commission in this area, it is likely that a 
submission would highlight the multiple violations of political and civil rights with 
respect to arbitrary arrests and wrongful deaths. This is the norm for submissions 
before the Commission. The bulk of the Commission’s jurisprudence relates to extra-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 INGO representative Interview, 9 May 2017.) 
124 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), Articles 14, 16 and 18. There is also a 
mention of the right to cultural development in Article 22. 
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judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture and access to justice.125 There are also clear 
provisions in the African Charter on each of these categories.126  
The remedies sought are likely to reflect the following 
We want remedies for the communities that have been displaced and the 
individuals that have been injured. We want to stop the construction of the 
Kajbar dam and to be able to use a decision as and when it is rendered to push 
back against Sudan dam building activities more broadly.127 
As is the norm in similar cases, we expect demands for reparation for victims of 
killings, arbitrary detention and other ill-treatment and an investigation into and 
prosecution of these violations. Most importantly with respect to Sudan, we anticipate 
an insistence on institutional and structural reforms to allow victims of similar 
violations access to remedies.  
Documentation available from the ACHPR shows GoS clearly using instability and 
conflict as a justification for not improving the human rights situation more 
expeditiously. It does not engage in an outright denial of allegations, but offers 
contextual justifications and explanations, and makes tactical, even token 
concessions. It is, however, important to keep in mind that these litigation efforts 
involve a country whose sitting head of state has two outstanding ICC arrest warrants 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In this respect, the expectations of the 
affected people and the litigation NGOs involved with respect to the outcome of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 See e.g. ACHPR Noah Kazingachire and others v. Zimbabwe	  (Communication 295/04, 51st 
Ordinary Session), and ACHPR Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi and others v. Sudan	  (Communication No. 
368/09, 54th Ordinary Session).  
126  Articles 1, 3, 5 and 7 (legal standing, due process and access to justice), and Articles 4 (life), 6 
(liberty and security). 
127 INGO representative Interview, 9 May 2017. 
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case seem to be correspondingly modest. Given the political climate in the country, 
the primary goal of the NGOs is apparently to utilize the Commission system in the 
hope that it may become ‘more creative and more effective over time in terms of 
translating rights’.128 
[The ACHPR] will never be able to influence the Government of Sudan to do 
anything about the Merowe Dam. Look at the response of the African 
countries about the ICC indictment over Darfur. Local people do not trust the 
African Commission and see it as an institution captured by a club of 
unaccountable states.129 
  
 
It is very hard to make the case that African Commission litigation is an 
effective vehicle for advocacy on a particular issues.130 
6. DISCUSSION  
 
As is common in large-scale development projects, the reaction of those affected by 
the Merowe Dam shifted from hopeful reception to outright rejection. This shift in 
response was the result of the failure of GoS to engage these communities in a bona 
fide multi-stakeholder process as called for by the guidelines developed by the WCD 
and other international standards. This failure, however, did not happen because GoS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 INGO representative Interview, 9 May 2017. 
 
129 JB Interview, 7 May 2017. 
 
130 INGO representative Interview, 9 May 2017. 
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rejected established international norms relevant to dam construction. On the 
contrary, there is evidence from legal instruments and policy documents that GoS 
acknowledged the existence of these norms and generally accepted them. The 
divergence in experience between the different groups of affected people with respect 
to government responses to their claims instead depended largely on the political 
climate in the country and on internal political dynamics tying these various groups to 
GoS. 
 
An examination of the legal matrix in Sudan applicable to the Merowe Dam struggle 
shows that the recognition of rights is the only dimension of environmental justice 
reflected in national law. For example, the EPA makes no mention of procedural 
guarantees regarding transparency, participation and accountability. According to the 
WCD principles, gaining public acceptance extends to addressing risks and 
safeguarding entitlements in addition to recognizing rights.131 In order to achieve 
these goals, participation of affected people is seen as key and good faith negotiations 
are essential. The WCD guidelines also emphasize the need for robust and effective 
legal and dispute mechanism resolutions to manage conflict, which were totally 
absent in the case of the Merowe Dam.  
 
The inadequacy of Sudanese laws and regulations in this respect is evident when 
assessed against the World Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Displacement 
(OP 4.12). This policy has been heavily criticized by environmentalist NGOs as well 
as scholars as being somewhat regressive in terms of guaranteeing acceptable living 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131World Commission on Dams (WCD) (2000) Dams and Development, November (Cape Town, 
WCD), at p.279. 
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standards for those displaced by development projects.132 Yet, laws and regulations in 
Sudan still fall short of the OP 4.12 standard, as confirmed in the GoS Resettlement 
Policy Framework developed for the WB project on Sustainable Livelihoods for 
Displaced and Vulnerable Communities in Eastern Sudan in 2016. According to this 
document, laws in Sudan are characterized by (i) the absence of a requirement for 
compensation prior to resettlement as well as lack of provisions on restoring or 
enhancing livelihood133; (ii) the absence of provisions on modalities for affecting 
relocation and guaranteeing adequate infrastructure in resettlement locations; and (iii) 
the absence of an obligation to conduct on-going consultations with affected people 
(at present, the requirement is for consultation prior to the expropriation of the land 
but not on ongoing basis throughout the project). This lack of adequate legal 
mechanisms may explain the failure of local litigation initiatives (including the resort 
to arbitration). However, there is ample evidence that GoS attempted to adhere to its 
own rudimentary norms of development, environmental justice and human rights.  
 
While the discourse of the government highlighted the safeguards existing under 
national laws, it also tended to acknowledge norms, which were championed by the 
affected people, such as participation. GoS may at times have downplayed the 
importance of these norms, or even have sought to manipulate the outcome of the 
required processes of engagement by choosing representatives from these 
communities that it can control, but it still seemed to accept the relevant norms in a 
general sense. This is interesting, not least because the political leadership of GoS is 
facing accusations of far more serious breaches of international standards especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See D. Clark and A. Carothers, Resettlement: The World Bank's Assault on the Poor (CIEL, 2000). 
133	  In the case of the Merowe Dam, compensation was promised in instalments and in many cases 
among the Manasir not paid (See Askouri, n. 29 aboev  )	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with respect to the Darfur war. If the pull of norms is to be adequately understood, the 
pertinent question to ask is what made GoS care about the existence of these norms in 
the first place? In this case, the apparent internalization of relevant norms (without 
good faith implementation) may have served the purpose of providing GoS with 
sufficient credibility to fend off criticisms over the building of the dam.  
 
The Merowe Dam case study departs from the basic assumptions of the Spiral Model. 
The expected immediate gains flowing from the involvement of transnational 
networks (or the Justice Broker) did not transpire. While GoS resorted to tactical 
concessions on ad-hoc basis, there is no evidence to suggest that the litigation 
initiatives in Germany and before the ACHPR contributed to changing GoS’ 
behaviour towards the affected people. Moreover, even though GoS was not 
particularly moved to respond to the intervention of the UN Rapporteur for Adequate 
Housing following the Amri complaint, it did in fact agree to a number of concessions 
in the case of Manasir following security threats in the area. For example, at the time 
of writing, GoS had completed the building of two new villages for resettlement 
around the reservoir lake for the Manasir on land the ownership of which is claimed 
by Amri on historical grounds.134 However, none of the pressing housing issues raised 
by the Amri Committee in their compliant to the UN Special Rapporteur for Adequate 
Housing were addressed. The interviews with activists also suggest that the special 
history that the Manasir and their leadership had with the government did affect their 
ability to manoeuvre the conflict to their advantage. Because the concessions made by 
GoS in acquiescing to the Manasir demands for recognition of the local option and 
resettlement around the reservoir lake came about as a result of political wrangling 
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  Informal discussion with AA in November 2017.	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and not following recognition of applicable legal norms or norms of justice,, it is not 
expected that this particular form of resistance is likely to translate into policy or 
regime change as predicted by the Spiral Model.  
 
It is also clear from the interaction between DAPs and litigation NGOs that the 
involvement of the latter is dependent on whether or not resistance is likely to 
translate into broader change that goes beyond the specific case of the affected people 
in questions both materially and geographically. Without immediate advocacy 
benefits to the causes involved, this may result in marginalization of the involvement 
of these international organizations as well as transnational networks in similar cases. 
The Merowe Dam case indicates that resorting to international or regional litigation as 
a viable resistance strategy should be approached with caution in a context like 
Sudan. Rather, the focus of resistance should be on internal efforts. However, given 
the importance of these actors in the development of international norms, it would be 
advisable to focus efforts on making international and regional forums more 
responsive to the needs of affected people in similar cases. For despite the limited 
impact of litigation efforts on the particular case of the Merowe Dam resistance, they 
did evince new thinking when it comes to environmental struggles.  
 
Despite its eventual dismissal, the significance of the case in Germany against 
Lahmyer International is three-fold. Firstly, it symbolizes a move away from 
dependency on unresponsive states for observing human rights and other norms 
towards a long overdue enquiry into the responsibility of multinational corporations 
for human rights violations. Secondly, it brings to the forefront the global context 
within which these violations happen and highlights the focus on economic growth 
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(including of economies of developed countries) regardless of the effect that this may 
have on social conditions in developing countries. Finally, it indicates that rather than 
international norms being influential in determining the trajectory of struggles against 
large-scale development projects, these struggles are in fact influencing the 
development of international norms quite tangibly. The effect of the African 
Commission case is harder to gauge, because of the long gestation period for 
decisions as well as the procedural bar on disclosure of information regarding 
ongoing litigation. What we can be sure of, however, is that the case is likely to 
influence the development of norms on indigenous rights to include other groups with 
comparable experience of large-development projects in the African Context. 
 
Furthermore, the Merowe Dam case study seems to highlight an additional issue with 
the underlying assumptions of the Spiral Model. Given the possibility of pressure 
from ‘abroad’, governments such as GoS tend to develop a discordant attitude 
towards the rights of the affected people. This involves having two uncoordinated 
dialogues: a domestic and an international one. Making use of a jumble of conflicting 
norms on the international plane, GoS strategically, and perhaps pre-emptively, 
invoked established (and often overlapping) international norms to justify actions that 
resulted in human rights abuses. In this way, GoS seems to have already reached rule 
consistent behaviour with respect to some international environmental and 
developmental norms but with a different set of “rules” that are not necessarily 
disputed by the DAPs. This creates an almost parallel trajectory of the Spiral model, 
with the DAPs engaged in one struggle, and GoS responding (legitimately) to another. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Contrary to the expectations of our theoretical model, which expands on the Spiral 
Model, the government’s responses to mobilization efforts by the local communities 
affected by the Merowe Dam over issues of resettlement and compensation had very 
little to do with normative convergence or divergence. There is ample evidence that 
GoS have reached rule-consistent behaviour with respect to recognition of DAPs 
rights. There is also evidence that GoS accepts the existence of international norms on 
participation and accountability despite the total lack of robust and effective legal and 
dispute resolution mechanisms to manage conflicts when they arise. The normative 
gap between GoS and the DAPs is also minimal when it comes to their conceptions of 
development and the need for economic growth.  
 
Rather than a normative gap, what seems to be the driving force behind the conflicts 
that erupted between GoS and the DAPs is the absence of good faith in the 
government’s interaction with these communities and the conceptualization of the 
DAPs as only tangentially relevant to the process of dam building. Given the 
contemporary political history of the country, it would be misguided to treat the 
Merowe Dam case as an isolated incident of injustice over dam construction. Instead, 
it evinces wider issues of state capture by the ruling regime and a generally 
dysfunctional relationship between the government and its people. The pattern of 
accommodating governmental responses to the Manasir struggle – as distinct from the 
other groups - as well as the characterization of the struggle by government officials 
as potentially political indicate the presence of an internal political dimension rarely 
explored in the literature.  
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The trajectory of the Manasir struggle mirrors the expectation of the Spiral Model in 
that, at some clear junctures of the struggle, GoS indeed made tactical concessions – 
often involving the granting of rights to the Manasir on ad hoc basis or at the expense 
of other groups.135 Unlike the predictions of the Spiral Model, however, none of these 
concessions are likely to lead to either policy or regime change given the lack of 
principled engagement on the Manasir side.  
 
In general, the success of the Manasir struggle against resettlement in the case of the 
Merowe Dam can be attributed to a number of factors that are overlooked by 
transnational networks. The conclusion of the CPA in 2005 opened a minute political 
space for the group to use in its mobilization efforts and technological advances 
allowed them to use social media platforms to rally support for the MEC. Most of the 
mobilization efforts, however, seem to have targeted members of the group itself as 
opposed to the wider public.136 Near-incidents of armed confrontation such as the 
Sani Valley in 2005 and the Kurbukan Valley in 2007, which came about as a result 
of cooperation amongst the Manasir communities and which subsequently led to GoS 
acceding to their demands, indicate how the focus on local community mobilization is 
a winning strategy. There also seems to be evidence that the Manasir struggle 
benefited from the split in Islamist ranks. This political dimension might provide the 
better explanation for the trajectory of the Manasir struggle including aspects of it that 
flout the expectations of the Spiral Model such as the reluctance to enlist the help of 
INGOs. In their attempt to ‘manipulate’ GoS to grant them their demands, the group 
seems to accept the position of the government as the ultimate arbiter of rights, which 
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  Ibid.	  
136 From an informal canvassing of opinion in Sudan, very few people knew about the conflict.  
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needs to be placated and cajoled rather than alienated and threatened by resorting to 
international pressure. 
 
Our research also shows that, given the constraints within which institutions such as 
the ACHPR operate, regional litigation efforts are unlikely to play an important role 
in environmental struggles over dam construction in Sudan or in Africa in the near 
future. This may alter significantly if attention is paid to reforming these regional 
institutions so that they are more responsive to advocacy campaigns. Procedural rules 
on disclosure and submission, as well as the enforcement of decisions, may be areas 
ripe for reform. Nevertheless, it is important to continue to bring claims against 
multinationals in their national legal systems where possible. The mere possibility of 
bringing litigation against corporations such as Lahmeyer International may inspire 
accountability that is not necessarily conditional on the safeguards already available 
in the laws of a country like Sudan. Having said that, the inadequacy of legal 
protection under Sudanese laws was what eventually led to the collapse of the case.  
 
In sum, it is hard to isolate the success or failure of environmental struggles in 
countries such as Sudan from issues of governance, domestic capacity building and 
legal reform. This research suggests that, despite their obvious allure, the promotion 
of international environmental norms in this area may have very little impact in light 
of the persistence of competing international norms on development and economic 
growth. This may imply that what is required is a policy shift refocusing attention 
away from the development and promulgation of environmental norms on the 
international level to issues of domestic institutional building and norm development 
on the national level. 
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